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Essay
Common Carriage's Domain
Christopher S. Y o o t
The judicial decision invalidating the Federal Communications
Commission'sfirstOpen Internet Order has led advocates to embrace common
carriage as the legal basis for network neutrality. In so doing, network
neutrality proponents have overlooked the academic literature on common
carriageas well as lessonsfrom its implementation history. This Essay distills
these learnings into five factors that play a key role in promoting common
carriage'ssuccess: (1) commodity products, (2) simple interfaces, (3) stability
and uniformity in the transmission technology, (4) full deployment of the
transmission network, and (5) stable demand and market shares. Applying this
framework to the Internet suggests that common carriage is not particularly
well suited as a basisfor regulatingbroadbandInternet access.

Introduction.......................................
......... 992
I. Common Carriage and Its Relationship with Network Neutrality............. 994
A. The Elusive Definition of Common Carriage........
.......... 994
B. Network Neutrality as Reflected in FCC Agency Actions.............. 997
1. Michael Powell's 2004 Four Freedoms and the 2005
Policy Statement
.........................
....... 999
2. The 2010 Open Internet Order...........
.............. 1000
3. The 2015 Open Internet Order...........
.............. 1002
4. The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order......
..... 1003
5. The Tacit Need for Rate Regulation
.................. 1004
C. The Connection Between Common Carriageand Network
......... 1006
...............................
Neutrality .
II. Factors that Make Common Carriage More Appropriate ..
.......... 1007
A. The Commodity Nature of the Regulated Product......
..... 1007
1. Nondiscrimination
........................
...... 1007
t
John H. Chestnut Professor of Law, Communication, and Computer & Information
Science, University of Pennsylvania. The author thanks the participants in "Revisiting the Public Utility:
A Research Roundtable" held at the Vanderbilt Law School on February 24, 2017, and the Conference
on "New Perspectives on U.S. Regulatory History: Past & Present of Public Utilities and Antitrust Law"
held at the Harvard Business School on June 4-5, 2018.

991

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 35, 2018

2. Rate Regulation
...................................
B. The Simplicity of the InterfacesSurrounding the Regulated
Product.............................
.............
1. Nondiscrimination
........................
......
2. Rate Regulation
...................................
C. Stability and Uniformity in the Transmission Technology..........
1. Nondiscrimination
........................
......
2. Rate Regulation
...................................
D. Whether the TransmissionNetwork Is Fully Built Out...............
1. Nondiscrimination
........................
......
2. Rate Regulation
...................................
E. Stability in the Demandfor Each Firm'sProduction.................
Conclusion
....................................................

1012
1014
1014
1016
1016
1017
1018
1019
1019
1021
1025
1025

Introduction
The concept of common carriage has played an increasingly important
role over the course of the debate over network neutrality. Network neutrality
supporters were initially quite hesitant to equate network neutrality with
common carriage. Over time, however, proponents became more amenable to
drawing a connection between the two concepts.2 Interest in common carriage
intensified further following the D.C. Circuit's 2014 decision in Verizon v.
FCC striking down portions of the Federal Communications Commission's
(FCC's) 2010 Open Internet Order on the grounds that it attempted to mandate
restrictions that could be imposed only on common carriers.3 Although the

1.

See, e.g., Tim Wu, Why Have a Telecommunications Law? Anti-Discrimination

Norms in Communications, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 16-17, 32-35 (2006) (noting the
heavy criticism of common carriage and proposing the substitution of a simple antidiscrimination rule);
see also Hance Haney, Eric Schmidt and Laurence Tribe on Common Carriage and Net Neutrality

Regulation, TECH. LIBERATION FRONT (Aug. 24, 2007), http://techliberation.com/2007/08/24/ericschmidt-and-laurence-tribe-on-common-carriage-and-net-neutrality-regulation
[http://perma.cc/A6BDJZAU] (quoting Google Chairman and CEO Eric Schmidt during a discussion of network neutrality as
stating that common carriage would be a mistake and expressing hope that any common carrier
obligations would be applied "pretty narrowly" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Part 2: Uses for
Devices of Multiple Capabilities CannotAlways Be Predictedor Channeled, COOK REP. ON INTERNET

PROTOCOL, TECH., ECON., & POL'Y 71, 91-92 (2006), http://cookreport.com/newsletter-sp-542240406
/pdf?download=61:pdf [http://perma.cc/F7KK-S3MD] (quoting Vint Cerf as "hesitat[ing]" to
characterize "neutrality as the 21st C [entury] version of common carriage"); John Windhausen, Jr.,
Good Fences Make Bad Broadband: Preserving an Open Internet Through Net Neutrality, PUB.

KNOWLEDGE 38 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/pk-net-neutrality-whitep20060206.pdf (rejecting arguments that network neutrality would replicate common carriage).
2.

See TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND

FALL OF INFORMATION

EMPIRES 311 (2010); Susan P. Crawford, Transporting Communications, 89 B.U. L. REV. 871 (2009);
Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, The New Network Neutrality: Criteriafor Internet Freedom,
12 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 225, 229, 238 (2008); Christian Sandvig, Network Neutrality Is the New
Common Carriage, 9 INFO 136 (2007); Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First
Amendment: Lessonsfrom Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 7 (2008).

3.
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Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 656-57 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Common Carriage's Domain
FCC appeared initially inclined to base its second Open Internet Order on
another statutory basis, a speech by President Barack Obama endorsing
common carriage as the best statutory basis for implementing network
neutrality changed the political calculus. After some hesitation, the FCC
embraced common carriage as the statutory basis for network neutrality in its
2015 Open Internet Order, and the D.C. Circuit upheld that decision on judicial
review.'
Network neutrality proponents tend to regard common carriage as a wellestablished and accepted baseline for regulating network industries. It is true
that common carriage regulation has long operated successfully in sectors such
as water, natural gas, and electric power.' At the same time, uncritical
invocations do not adequately reflect the extensive commentary and regulatory
proceedings that identify the problems and limitations associated with common
carriage in the telecommunications sector. These problems include definitional
difficulties, the lack of incentives to economize, the systematic biases it
induces, its tendency to stifle innovation and facilitate collusion, and its
vulnerability to opportunism.' Indeed, the FCC has recognized the flaws in
common carriage since at least 1979 and has taken steps to limit its scope. 9
The goal of this Essay is to use historical examples and the commentary
analyzing common carriage to identify the points of commonality between
common carriage and network neutrality, as well as the circumstances under
which common carriage is likely to be an appropriate regulatory intervention.
Rather than creating a grand theory of common carriage, the analysis follows
the approach taken by the Supreme Court's decision in Trinko by taking into

4.
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 29
FCC Rcd. 5561, 5647-48 (2014) (statement of Chairman Tom Wheeler).
5.
Obama White House, President Obama's Statement on Keeping the Internet Open
and Free, YOUTUBE (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uKcjQPVwfDk [http:/
perma.cc/5KY5-LGCD].
6.
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, Report and Order on Remand,
Declaratory Ruling, and Order, 30 FCC Rcd. 5601, 5724-25 ¶¶283-87, 5757-90 ¶¶355-408 (2015)
[hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order], aff'd sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
7.

See, e.g., JEFFREY CHURCH &

ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A

STRATEGIC APPROACH § 26.2.3, at 853-54 (2000); Eli M. Noam, Towards an Integrated
Communications Market: Overcoming the Local Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM. L.J.
209, 219 (1982).
8.
Christopher S. Yoo, Is There a Role for Common Carriagein an Internet-Based
World?, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 545, 573-605 (2013).
9.
See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and
Facilities Authorizations Therefor, Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d 308, 30910 ¶¶ 1-3 (1979); see also John Haring & Evan Kwerel, Competition Policy in the Post-Equal Access
Market 5-11 (FCC Office of Plans & Pol'y Working Paper, 1987), http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP
/workingpapers/oppwp22.pdf [http://perma.cc/6ZQZ-AM4F];NTIA REGULATORY REV. STAFF, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMM.,
NTIA REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES REPORT 13-31
(1987),
http:/
www.its.bldrdoc.gov/publications/download/87-222_ocr.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2MG6-6A2A].
See
generally Scott M. Schoenwald, Regulating Competition in the Interexchange Telecommunications
Market: The Dominant/Nondominant CarrierApproach and the Evolution of Forbearance, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 367, 375-83 (1997) (reviewing the regulatory history).
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account the effectiveness of the proposed remedies when determining the scope
of liability.'o This Essay recovers this literature evaluating the efficacy of
common carriage" as well as the insights from the history of enforcing
nondiscrimination mandates under the antitrust laws to synthesize a framework
for identifying the circumstances under which common carriage is most likely
to be effective. The analysis suggests that common carriage is most effective
when five circumstances are met:
1. The product being regulated is a commodity.
2. The interfaces between the product being regulated and related products
are simple.
3. The transmission technology is uniform and stable.
4. The transmission network is fully built out.
5. The demand for each firm producing the regulated product is relatively
stable.
This framework provides a basis for evaluating whether common carriage
is an appropriate regulatory device to govern the modem Internet both in terms
of network neutrality and the regulation of cloud computing.
Part I provides an overview of the difficulty identifying a coherent
theoretical basis for common carriage, traces the regulatory development of
network neutrality, and identifies the points of commonality between the two
concepts. Part II analyzes the five factors identified above and evaluates how
they affect the key aspects of common carriage regulation.
I. Common Carriage and Its Relationship with Network Neutrality
This Part lays out the concepts of common carriage and network
neutrality and analyzes the connection between them. The linkage between the
two concepts underscores how the practical limitations identified with respect
common carriage can help inform the network neutrality debate.
A. The Elusive Definition of Common Carriage
Over the years, scholars and courts have repeated attempted to devise a
coherent framework for determining when common carriage should apply,

10.

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,

414-15 (2004).
11.
For textbook discussions of the problems associated with the regulatory tools used
to implement common carriage, see, for example, DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 672-78 (3d ed. 2000); CHURCH & WARE, supra note 7, § 26.2.2,
at 847-52; 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 27-32

(1970) [hereinafter 1 KAHN]. See generally 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 11-59, 93-94, 108-12, 325-27 (1971) [hereinafter 2 KAHN]; W. KIP
VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 431-36, 560-71 (4th ed. 2005).
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'

without much success.' 2 Although some early cases suggested that common
carriage was appropriate for industries "affected with the public interest," the
Supreme Court "discarded" that test, concluding that "there is no closed class
or category of businesses affected with a public interest"13 and that the phrase
was "not susceptible of definition and form[ed] an unsatisfactory test."14
Other commentators have argued that natural monopoly represents the
defining characteristic of common carriers." Such arguments are contradicted
by the fact that common carriage mandates have often been applied to firms
that lacked monopoly power, such as taxis, inns, trucks, and long-haul railroad
routes served by multiple providers.' 6 The lack of centrality of market power is
further underscored by the fact that the statute defines "telecommunications
service," which in turn determines the scope of common carriage," in purely
technological terms without any reference to market power.' 8
Another theory is that common carriers are those companies that hold
themselves out as being open to the public.' 9 Not only is this interpretation
questionable as a matter of history.20 It allows firms who wish to avoid
common carriage treatment to do so simply by declaring that it did not purport
to serve all comers. 2

&

12.
For an excellent survey of this literature, see Thomas Nachbar, The Public
Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 79-109 (2008).
13.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 536 (1934).
14.
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974). See generally Yoo,
supranote 8, at 554-59.
15.
For the seminal argument, see Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a
Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 156, 161 (1904). For a modern restatements of this
position, see U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 749-54 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (Williams, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Silberman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
16.
For the seminal statement of this critique, see Edward A. Adler, Business
Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REV. 135, 148 (1914). For modem restatements, see HERBERT
HOvENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 131-48 (1991); Joseph D. Keamey
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation ofRegulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323,
1388-89 (1998); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Public Network, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 67, 96-100
(2008); James B. Speta, A Common CarrierApproach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J.

225, 259 (2002).
17.
47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2018) ("A telecommunications carrier shall be treated as a
common carrier under this chapter only to the extent that it is engaged in providing telecommunications
services.").
18.
Id. §§ 153(53) (defining "telecommunications service" as "the offering of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively
available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities used"); id. § 153(50) (defining
"telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of
information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received.").
19.
For the seminal statement of this argument, see Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of
the PeculiarDuties ofPublic Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 518-25 (1911). For a modem
restatement ,see Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private
Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1282 (1996).
20.
Nachbar, supra note 12, at 86-93.
21.
Yoo, supra note 8, at 553-54.
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Still other commentators have attempted to base a definition of common
carriage on the fact that it has historically been tied to the transportation and
communications industries.22 Not only are these definitions not specified
clearly enough to provide a basis for determining which transportation and
communication business fall inside the definition and which ones fall outside.23
Moreover, assuming that the historical pedigree somehow legitimizes the
classification violates Hume's basic precept that one cannot get an "ought"
from an "is." 24
The definition of common carriage has proven elusive as a matter of
positive law as well. The statute contains an unhelpfully circular definition of
"common carrier" that includes "any person engaged as a common carrier for
hire."25 The judicial decision upholding the 2010 Open Internet Order turned to
definitions synthesized by the court in the landmark decisions in NARUC I and
NARUC I. 26 NARUC II concluded that "the primary sine qua non of common
carrier status is a quasi-public character, which arises out of the undertaking to
carry for all people indifferently." 27 NARUC I held that "a carrier will not be a
common carrier where its practice is to make individualized decisions, in
particular cases, whether and on what terms to deal" as opposed to "holding
oneself out to serve the public indiscriminately." 28
The judicial definition of common carriage provides the foundation for
two defining characteristics of common carriage. Undertaking to carry all
people is often called the duty to serve and is reflected in statutory language
obligating common carriers to provide "communication service upon
reasonable request." 29 Serving the public indiscriminately is the equivalent of

nondiscrimination and is enshrined in the statutory language prohibiting
common carriers from "mak[ing] any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in
charges." 30 Indeed, when reviewing the FCC's 2010 Open Internet Order, the
D.C. Circuit characterized nondiscrimination as "the basic characteristic that
distinguishes common carriers from 'private' carriers."3 1

22.
Crawford, supranote 2, at 885, 915; Nachbar, supra note 12, at 81-84, 109; Speta,
supra note 16, at 252-53, 255, 257; Richard S. Whitt, Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive
Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 491-92 (2009); Wu,

supra note 1, at 30-31.
23.
Yoo, supra note 8, at 558-59.
24.
Id. at 558.
25.
47 U.S.C. § 153(11) (2018).
26.
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
27.
Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC 1l), 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (internal quotation marks omitted), quoted in Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651.
28.
Nat'l Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC (NARUC 1), 525 F.2d 630, 641, 642
(D.C. Cir. 1976), quoted in Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651.
29.
47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018).
30.
Id. § 202(a).
31.
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 651; accord id. at 652 (holding that "'[i]f a carrier is forced
to offer service indiscriminately and on general terms, then that carrier is being relegated to common
carrier status' (quoting Cellco P'ships v. FCC 700 F.3d 534, 547-49 (D.C. Cir. 2012))).
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In addition, common carriers typically are subject to rate regulation,
reflected in the statutory requirement that all charges be "just and
reasonable."32 Courts and commentators have characterized rate regulation as
one of the essential characteristics of common carriage.3
In essence, the judicial definition and the statute suggest that the core
elements of common carriage are the duty to serve, nondiscrimination, and rate
regulation. Indeed, advocates of network neutrality have acknowledged as
much.34
B. Network Neutrality as Reflected in FCC Agency Actions
The structure of the governing federal statute establishes a deep
connection between network neutrality and common carriage. Title II of the
statute defines "telecommunications carrier" as "any provider of
telecommunications services" and provides that "[a] telecommunications
carrier shall be treated as a common carrier under this chapter only to the extent
that it is engaged in providing telecommunications
services."3
"Telecommunications
service"
is defined
as "the
offering
of
telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users
as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless of the facilities
used." 36 "Telecommunications" is defined as "the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing,
without change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received." 37
Telecommunications service stands in contrast with an alternative
statutory definition known as "information service," which the statute defines
as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming,
processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via

47 U.S.C. § 201(b).
32.
33.
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229-32 (1994)
(calling the tariff-filing requirement "the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications
Act" and essential to ensuring reasonable rates); ABC, Inc. v. FCC, 643 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that the statutory requirement of just and reasonable rates drew on "the common-law doctrines
respecting common carriers"); H.W. Chaplin, Limitations upon the Right of Withdrawal from Public
Employment, 16 HARV. L. REV. 555, 556-57 (1903) (identifying charging reasonable rates as one of the
three fundamental duties imposed on common carriers); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1330-31 (1998) ("For
almost a century, public utility companies and common carriers had one common characteristic: All
were required to offer their customers service under rates and practices that were just, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory."). See generally Yoo, supra note 8, at 571 (examining the historical and conceptual
ties between common carriage and rate regulation).
34.
Wu, supra note 2, at 57 (recognizing that common carriage "was a promise to
serve any customer willing to pay, charge fixed rates, and carry his or her traffic without
discrimination").
35.
47 U.S.C. § 153(51) (2018).
36.
Id. § 153(53).
37.
Id. § 153(50).
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telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include
any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications
service." 38 The FCC's 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order recently
confirmed its longstanding recognition that telecommunications service and
information service are mutually exclusive categories, 39 an interpretation that is
confirmed by the legislative history,40 agency practice, 4' and was reflected in
the Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling that the Supreme Court affirmed in
BrandX.42
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in its 2005 BrandX decision, when
enacting the definitions of telecommunications service and information service,
Congress incorporated the regulatory definitions of "basic service" and
"information service" the FCC created in the Computer II proceeding to
regulate data-processing services offered over telephone wires.4 3 The FCC had

characterized basic service as "a pure transmission capability over a
communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction with
customer supplied information." 44 The Supreme Court has held that the
Computer II definitions are similar and analogous to the statutory definition 4 5
and relied upon the regulatory interpretation of basic service as "pure" and

38.
Id. § 153(24).
39.
Restoring Internet Freedom, Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order,
WC Docket 17-108 (adopted Dec. 14, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily Releases/DailyBusiness
/2018/dbO104/FCC-17-166Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/XX8C-764A] [hereinafter 2017 Restoring Internet
Freedom Order].
40.
S. REP. No. 104-23, at 1-2, 18, 23, 98 (1995)
41.
Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireless Networks, Declaratory Ruling, 22 FCC Rcd. 5901, 5909-11 ¶¶ 19-27 (2007); United Power
Line Council's Petition for Declaratory Ruling Regarding the Classification of Broadband over Power
Line Internet Access Service as an Information Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd.
13281, 13285-86 ¶¶ 8-10 (2006); Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd. 14853, 1486265 ¶¶ 12-17, 14909-12 ¶¶ 102-106 (2005), petition for review denied sub nom. Time Warner Telecom,
Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007); Petition for Declaratory Ruling That AT&T's Phone-to-Phone
IP Telephony Services Are Exempt from Access Charges, Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 7457, 7460-61 ¶ 6
(2004); Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Order on Remand, 16 FCC Rcd. 9751, 9755 ¶8, 9770 ¶36
(2001); Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501,
11520-26 ¶¶39-48, 11536-40 ¶¶ 73-82 (1998).
42.
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other
Facilities, Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4821-23 ¶¶37-38 (2002), aff'd
sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 987-91, 1000
(2005).
43.
BrandX, 545 U.S. at 992.
44.
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 ¶ 96 (1980) [hereinafter Computer II
Final Decision].
45.
Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976; see also id. at 995 (calling "telecommunications
service" under the statute and "basic service" under Computer II"parallel term[s]").
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"transparent" transmission when evaluating the proper regulatory classification
for last-mile broadband access.46
As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, the statute permits regulating lastmile broadband providers as common carriers only if they are providing
telecommunications services governed by Title II of the statute.47 Simply put,
regulations that impose common carrier treatment on providers who are not
offering telecommunications services "cannot stand." 48 The applicable
regulatory definition thus plays a key role in determining whether a last-mile
broadband provider is regarded as a common carrier, which in turn determines
whether the agency may subject it to the type of regulation associated with
common carriage.
1. Michael Powell's 2004 Four Freedoms and the 2005 Policy Statement
The modem debate on network neutrality began with a speech given by
then-FCC Chairman Michael Powell in February 2004, in which he laid out
four "Internet freedoms" that he encouraged companies to embrace.49
Specifically, consumers should have the freedom to (1) access content of their
choice, (2) use applications of their choice, (3) attach personal devices of their
choice, and (4) obtain meaningful information about their service plans.50
Powell's vision was not regulatory in focus. His speech was subtitled,
"Guiding Principles for the Industry," 5' and a section was subtitled,
"Empowering Consumers Without Regulating the Internet." 52 Moreover, in the
body of his speech, he warned that "the case for government imposed
regulations regarding the use or provision of broadband content, applications
and devices is unconvincing and speculative."5 3 Instead, he favored "giv[ing]
the private sector a clear road map by which it can avoid future regulation on
this issue by embracing unparalleled openness and consumer choice."54 He
argued that "if we secure a reasonable balance between the needs of network
providers and intemet freedom, consumers will reap the benefits of broadband
55
without intrusive regulation."
Rather than proposing regulation, Chairman

46.
Id. at 976, 988, 990-91, 993, 998, 1000.
47.
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
48.
Id. at 650.
49.
Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Silicon
Flatirons Symposium on "The Digital Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the
Internet Age": Preserving Internet Freedom: Guiding Principles for the Industry 5 (Feb. 8, 2004), http:/
apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-243556Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/A3BC-H9QM].
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 1.
52.
Id. at 3.
53.
Id. at 4.
54.
Id. at 5.
55.
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
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Powell was trying to get the industry to act on its own. As such, it did not need
to invoke any particular statutory basis for its actions.
The four Internet freedoms extolled by Chairman Powell were echoed in
the 2005 Policy Statement that the FCC issued in conjunction with its decision
classifying DSL as an information system. 56 Specifically, the FCC adopted four
principles that it planned to "incorporate . . . into its ongoing policymaking

activities."57 These principles stated that consumers are entitled to (1) "access
the lawful Internet content of their choice," (2) "run applications and use
services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement," (3) "connect
their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network," and (4) ensure
"competition among network providers, application and service providers, and
content providers."58 The Policy Statement noted in a footnote, "The principles
we adopt are subject to reasonable network management." 59
The 2004 Four Freedoms speech and the 2005 Policy Statement exhibit
the initial outlines of modem network neutrality. In focusing on guaranteeing
consumers' right to access content, run applications and services, and attach
devices, the first three principles provide the foundation for what will become
the non-blocking rule. The fourth freedom in Chairman Powell's speech is
clearly the precursor to the modem transparency rule.
The Policy Statement was ambiguous as to whether it is treating last-mile
broadband access as a telecommunications service or an information service,
discussing both potential bases for authority rather noncommittally.60
Determining the precise statutory basis was not that important because, as the
Policy Statement explicitly acknowledged, the agency was "not adopting rules
in this policy statement" and was simply announcing principles that it would
"incorporate

. . . into its ongoing policymaking

activities." 62 The

FCC

attempted to sanction Comcast in 2008 for violating the Policy Statement only
to see that action overturned by the D.C. Circuit in 2010 for being outside the
agency's authority.6 3
2. The 2010 Open Internet Order
The loss in the Comcast case and the change in administration prompted
the FCC to engage in formal rulemaking procedures that culminated in the

56.
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Policy Statement, 20 FCC Rcd. 14986 (2005).
57.
Id. at 14988.
58.
Id.
59.
Id. at 14988 n.15.
60.
Id. at 14987.
61.
Id. at 14988 n.15.
62.
Id. at 14988.
63.
Formal Complaint of Free Press & Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 13028
(2008), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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2010 Open Internet Order.64 The 2010 Order implemented network neutrality
by adopting three basic rules to fixed broadband providers: (1) The
transparency rule required them to "disclose the network management
practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of their
broadband services," offering guidance as to nine types of information that
should be disclosed. 65 (2) The "no blocking" rule prohibited them from
"block[ing] lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices,
subject to reasonable network management," which included impairing or
degrading websites or applications so as to make them "effectively unusable."66
(3) The "no unreasonable discrimination" rule forbids them from
"unreasonably discriminat[ing] against transmitting lawful network traffic" and
identified four considerations to serve as guidance as to what constitutes
reasonable, including transparency, end-user control, use-agnosticism, and
compliance with industry standards.6 7
The three rules embodied in the 2010 Open Internet Order capture the
primary outline of modem network neutrality. The addition of
nondiscrimination had the vocal support of Commissioner Michael Copps, who
argued for adding nondiscrimination to transparency and nonblocking in a
series of speeches between 2006 and 2009.68
The 2010 Order recognized three exceptions. First, the rules were subject
to reasonable network management, informed by the considerations offered to
guide what constituted an unreasonable discrimination rule plus two additional
considerations: ensuring network security and integrity and managing network
congestion. 69 Second, mobile broadband was subject to the transparency rule,
but was exempt from the no unreasonable discrimination rule and was subject
to the no blocking rule only with respect to applications that competed directly

64.
Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 FCC Rcd. 17905 (2010).
65.
Id. at 17906 1, 17936-41 ¶¶ 53-61.
66.
Id. at 17906 1, 17941-44 ¶¶ 62-67.
67.
Id. at 17906 1, 17944-51 ¶¶ 67-79.
68.
See, e.g., Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23
FCC Rcd. 13028, 13080 (2008) (statement of Copps, Comm'r); Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of
Inquiry, 22 FCC Rcd. 7894, 7903 (2007) (Copps, Comm'r, concurring); Applications for Consent to the
Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of Licenses, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 FCC Rcd.
8203, 8368 (2006) (Copps, Comm'r, dissenting); Michael J. Copps, Acting Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Remarks at the Free Press Summit: Changing Media (May 14, 2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov
/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-290735Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/UMR8-GRCH]; Michael J. Copps,
Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at Pike & Fischer's Broadband Policy Summit IV (June
12, 2008), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-282890Al.pdf
[http://perma.cc
/NP9N-E3FM]; Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at En Banc Hearing on
Broadband
Network
Management
Practices,
Stanford
University
(Apr.
17,
2008),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-281625Al.pdf
[http://perma.cc/R5XAGNMM]; Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at En Banc Hearing on
Broadband Network Management Practices, Cambridge, Massachusetts (Feb. 25, 2008),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-280440Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/HW9V-3HFY].
69.
Id. at 17908 ¶6, 17951-56 TT 80-92.
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with their voice or video telephony services.70 Finally, the Order acknowledged
an exception for specialized services, described as video and voice services that
share capacity with broadband service."
In terms of statutory authority, the 2010 Order treated last-mile broadband
access as an information service instead of a telecommunications service.7 2 The
D.C. Circuit accepted the statutory basis asserted by the FCC, but held that
because nondiscrimination was the quintessential common carriage obligation,
the agency could mandate nondiscrimination only with respect to providers it
had classified as providing telecommunications services. 73 In essence, common
carriage and the nondiscrimination mandate that the 2010 Order began treating
as an essential aspect of network neutrality were inexorably linked, although
the court clearly signaled that the FCC could implement a similar regime based
around the commercial reasonableness standard upheld with respect to data
roaming.74
3. The 2015 Open Internet Order
The FCC responded to the partial reversal of its 2010 Open Internet Order
by promulgating a new Open Internet Order in 2015 to govern last-mile
broadband access (now called broadband Internet access service or BIAS). The
FCC established three new bright-line rules that mandated (1) no blocking of
lawful content, applications, services, or nonharmful devices, subject to
reasonable network management, (2) no throttling of Internet traffic on the
basis of content, application, or service, or use of a non-harmful device, and (3)
no paid prioritization unless the provider receives a waiver from the FCC.
The Order backed up these bright-line rules with a general conduct standard
prohibiting unreasonable interference and disadvantage, to be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis. 76 The first two bright-line rules and the general conduct
standard are subject to reasonable network management, although the brightline rule against paid prioritization is not.
In addition, the 2015 Order enhanced the transparency rule7 ' and retained
the exception for specialized services (now renamed non-BIAS services), 79 but

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 17908 ¶8, 17956-58 TT 93-96.
Id. at 17908 ¶7, 17964-66 TT 112-114.
Id. at 17967-81 TT 117-137.
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 655-57 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Id. at 652, 657 (citing Cellco P'ships v. FCC 700 F.3d 534, 547-49 (D.C. Cir.

75.

2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5607-08 TT 14-18, 5645-58 TT 104-

76.

Id. at 5608-09 TT 20-22, 5647

2012)).
107, 110-132.

¶ 108,

5659-60 TT 133-137. The Order offered

guidance for determining what constitutes unreasonable interference and disadvantage, including enduser control, competitive effects, consumer protection, free expression, application agnosticism, and

standard practices. Id. at 5661-64 TT 138-145
77.
Id. at 5611 TT 32-34, 5699-704 TT 214-224.
78.
Id. at 5609 TT 23-24, 5647 T 109, 5669-82 TT 154-185.
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abolished the differential treatment of mobile broadband, choosing to make
technical differences a consideration to be taken into account when determining
what constitutes reasonable network management.8 0 The Order made a
significant extension by asserting jurisdiction over the terms under which
networks interconnect with each other, which it planned to regulate on a caseby-case basis."
In terms of legal authority, the FCC broke with the approach it had
followed since 2002, no longer treating BIAS as an information service and
instead reclassifying it as a telecommunications service.82 Rather than apply the
entire regime governing telecommunications services, which was largely
developed for traditional voice telephony, the FCC chose to apply only six of
the statutory provisions and forebore from all other requirements.83 The D.C.
Circuit upheld both the change in statutory authority and the substantive
provisions on judicial review.84
Although the names attached to the rules changed slightly, the basic
outlines of the substantive regulations remained the same. The 2015 Order
retained the transparency and no blocking rules. The nondiscrimination
principle added in 2010 was embodied into rules against throttling, paid
prioritization, and a general conduct standard barring unreasonable interference
and disadvantage. Once reclassified as a telecommunications service, requiring
BIAS providers to provide the quintessential common carriage obligation of
nondiscrimination became unproblematic. The addition of interconnection
represented a new development, but in terms of legal authority, it fell naturally
from the reclassification of BIAS as a telecommunications service, since the
statute gives the FCC jurisdiction over how telecommunications service
providers interconnect with one another. 5
4. The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order
On December 14, 2017, the FCC voted to replace the 2015 Open Internet
Order with the Restoring Internet Freedom Order. 86 The Order retained a

79.
Id. at 5611 T35, 5696-98 TT 207-213.
80.
Id. at 5650-51 TT 116-18, 5634-43 TT 86-101, 5664-65 T146-149.
81.
Id. at 5610 ¶28, 5686-96 TT 194-206.
82.
Id. at 5612-16 TT 37-50, 5757-77 TT 355-387. The FCC effected the same outcome
for wireless broadband by reclassifying it as from a Private Radio Service to a Commercial Radio
Service. Id. at 5778-90 TT 388-408.
83.
Id. at 5616-17 TT 51-59, 5804-67 TT 434-542.
84.
U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
85.
See 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2018) (giving the FCC the authority to require common
carriers "to establish physical connections with other carriers" and "to establish [the] routes and charges
applicable thereto" when it "finds such action necessary and desirable in the public interest"); id.
§251(a)(1) (placing on telecommunications carriers the general duty "to interconnect directly or
indirectly with the facilities and equipment of other telecommunications carriers").
86.
2017 Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 39.
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refined version of the transparency rule," but abolished the bright-line rules
prohibiting blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization along with the general
conduct standard." The Restoring Internet Freedom Order also renounced FCC
oversight over interconnection89 and preempted inconsistent state regulation.90
In terms of legal authority, the Restoring Internet Freedom Order reversed the
decision of the 2015 Open Internet Order embracing common carriage and
returned to the original classification of BIAS as an information service. 9' The
Senate voted on May 16, 2018, to invoke Congressional Review Act to block
this Order from taking effect. 92 The House of Representatives has yet to act on
the resolution.
5. The Tacit Need for Rate Regulation
Although Chairman Wheeler repeatedly claimed that the 2015 Open
Internet Order did not involve rate regulation,93 his later statements made clear
that he regarded the authority to regulate rates as an essential component of
network neutrality. For example, in a March 2016 interview, he acknowledged
that regulators enforcing network neutrality "still want to have rate authority"
enforced through ex post review of complaints. 94 He also testified before the
Senate Appropriations Committee that eliminating ex post review of rates
would "gut[] the Open Internet Order." 95
A moment's reflection makes clear the reasons underlying the FCC's
insistence that some form of rate regulation is necessary to make
nondiscrimination effective. Without some restriction on overall rates,
nondiscrimination would not prevent a vertically integrated provider from
excluding unaffiliated providers of complementary services. Instead of singling

87.
Id. at 125-40 ¶¶ 209-238.
88.
Id. at 140-78 ¶¶ 239-296.
89.
Id. at 99-106 ¶¶ 163-173.
90.
Id. at 117-23 ¶¶ 194-204.
91.
Id. at 8-98 ¶¶ 20-161.
92.
164 CONG. REC. S2698 (daily ed. May 16, 2018)
93.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5915 (statement of Chairman Tom
Wheeler); Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the International Institute of
Communications
Annual
Conference
3
(Oct.
7,
2015),
http://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-335877Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/TJ7W-EA28]; Tom
Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Broadband Communities Summit 3 (Apr.
14, 2015), http://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-332988Al.pdf [http://perma.cc/X53AH4Q2]; Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law Symposium on "The Future of Internet Regulation" 8 (Mar. 27, 2015),
http://apps.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-332731Al.pdf[http://perma.cc/5FGW-Q67E].
94.
See Jon Brodkin, Why Tom Wheeler Rejected BroadbandPrice Caps and Lastmile Unbundling, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 16, 2016, 8:47 AM), http://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2016/03/why-tom-wheeler-rejected-broadband-price-caps-and-last-mile-unbundling
[http://perma.cc/XL3H-ZCAD].
95.

FinancialServices and General GovernmentAppropriationsfor Fiscal Year 2017:

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov't of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 114th

Cong. 35 (2016) (testimony of Tom Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n).
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out unaffiliated complementary service providers by charging them higher
prices, a vertically integrated company could simply charge the same high price
to both affiliated and unaffiliated complementary service providers. The
nondiscriminatory high price would have the same exclusionary effect on
unaffiliated complementary service providers as would discriminatory prices.
At the same time, the uniform higher price would have no adverse effect on the
vertically integrated company, as any losses resulting in higher prices paid by
the affiliated complementary service provider would simply appear as gains
earned by the regulated part of the business. Nondiscrimination mandates
simply reallocate profits from the complementary service subsidiary to the
regulated subsidiary. Parent companies care only about the total profit earned
and are agnostic about which part of the company earns profits. A regulator
could ban vertical integration altogether, but in doing so would run counter to
considerable evidence that vertical integration is often beneficial to
consumers. 96

Thus nondiscrimination without rate regulation will not prevent vertically
integrated companies from engaging in exclusionary conduct. 97 In short,
nondiscrimination would at most address some of the symptoms of whatever
market power exists without having any impact on the sources of that market
power. 98 That is why there is reason to be skeptical of claims that a simple
nondiscrimination mandate without rate regulation would be sufficient to
prevent vertical exclusion.99
It is true that the 2015 Open Internet Order avers at some points that its
terms did not involve rate regulation, 0 0 as did Chairman Wheeler in his
separate statement.' 0' However, the later part of the Order clearly indicates that
it eschewed only ex ante rate regulation, 02 as the dissenting Commissioners

96.
For surveys of the empirical literature on vertical integration, see Francine
Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. ECON.
LIT. 629, 680 (2007) (finding that "under most circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration
decisions are efficient, not just from firms' but also from the consumers' points of view" and calling on
"government agencies to reconsider the validity of... restrictions" on vertical integration).
97.

W. Kip VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 238-40 (3d

ed. 2000); Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19
YALE J. ON REG. 171, 192-93 (2002).
98.
3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOvENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW T 773 (1996);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 208 (1976); Noam, supra note 7,

at 219.
99.
See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Is Uber a Common Carrier?, 12 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR
INFO. SOC'Y 135, 148-51 (2015); Wu, supra note 1, at 43-44.
100.
The FCC first asserted its claim that the 2015 Open Internet Order would not
constitute rate regulation in an op-ed published in Wired prior to the adoption of the Order. Tom
Wheeler, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler: This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED (Feb. 4,
2015,
11:00
AM),
http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality
[http://perma.cc/Y7PH-JR3N]. The Order also repeatedly emphasized the lack of rate regulation. 2015
Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5603 ¶ 5, 5612 ¶ 37, 5775 ¶ 382.
101.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 5809 ¶¶441-443, 5814 ¶445, 5814
¶452, 5842 ¶ 499, 5846-47 ¶ 508, 5854-55 ¶ 519.
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pointed out 0 3 and one of the majority Commissioners conceded.' 04 Claims that
ex post review does not constitute rate regulation ignores the Supreme Court's
recognition in the landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan that ex post
liability can be just as restrictive as ex ante prohibitions.' 0 5 They also ignore the
fact the FCC has used ex post review as the standard tool for evaluating the
reasonableness of rates of all telecommunications services since the demise of
tariffing in 1996.106
C. The Connection Between Common Carriageand Network Neutrality
The foregoing reveals the extent to which the concepts of common
carriage and network neutrality are tied at both a statutory and a conceptual
level. In terms of the governing statute, the FCC may treat a last-mile
broadband provider as a common carrier only if it is providing
telecommunications services. Because nondiscrimination is the quintessential
common carriage remedy, the agency it may not subject a provider to a
nondiscrimination mandate unless it classifies it as a telecommunications
carrier.
The similarity of the two categories at the conceptual level makes it
unsurprising that the statute treats them as interrelated. The duty to serve
identified by the courts as one of the defining aspects of common carriage is
the equivalent of the no blocking obligation that was the heart of the 2005
Policy Statement and the 2010 and 2015 Open Internet Orders. The no
unreasonable discrimination rule of the 2010 Open Internet Order and its
various renamed incarnations in the 2015 Open Internet Order (including also
the ban on throttling and paid prioritization and the general conduct standard
against unreasonable interference or disadvantage) are the equivalent of the
obligation to provide indiscriminate service that the courts have identified as
one of the signature characteristics of common carriage. In addition, regulators
implementing common carriage and the FCC implementing network neutrality
both regard some degree of at least ex post rate regulation as essential to both
regulatory approaches. That is why commentators on both sides of the network

103.
Id. at 5922 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Ajit Pai); id. at 6000
(dissenting statement of Commissioner Michael O'Rielly).
104.
Id. at 5918 (implicitly acknowledging the presence of ex post rate regulation by
pointing out "how high the bar is when it comes to the FCC intervening on rates and charges" and
emphasizing that the agency has rarely overturned rates outside the context of inmate calling or a tariff
investigation).
105.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
106.
Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace,
Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, Second Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 20730, 20743 ¶21, 20746 ¶26 (1996) (discussing FCC's ability to use its ex post
complaint authority to resolve discrimination claims, even in the absence of filed tariffs), aff'd sub nom.
MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (2000).
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neutrality debate have regarded common carriage and network neutrality as
equivalent.0 7
II. Factors that Make Common Carriage More Appropriate
The recognition of the connection between common carriage and network
neutrality suggests that the implementation of network neutrality would likely
benefit from an appreciation of the circumstances under which common
carriage has proven more likely to benefit consumers. Rather than repeat past
efforts to identify a grand foundational theory of common carriage and apply it
from the top down, this Essay offers a more pragmatic, bottom-up approach
that examines the limits of the instruments used to implement common carriage
and c the circumstances under which it is more likely to succeed and more
likely to fail. The critique of common carriage appearing in the scholarly
literature suggests the existence of five conditions that must be satisfied if
common carriage is to be given the best chance of success.
A. The Commodity Nature of the Regulated Product
The first consideration that makes common carriage more effective is
whether the product being regulated is a commodity. The nature of the product
has an impact on both the implementation of nondiscrimination as well as the
effectiveness of rate regulation.
1. Nondiscrimination
Nondiscrimination is considerably harder to enforce when the regulated
product is not a commodity. In essence, nondiscrimination requires providers to
charge the same price to all customers buying the same product. Stated
somewhat more formally, the textbook definition of price discrimination is a
price differential that is not justified by variations in cost or product quality and
is instead based on buyers' willingness to pay.' Thus, the nondiscrimination
mandate of common carriage "is not concerned with price differentials between
qualitatively different services or service packages."' 0 9

107.
For statements of network neutrality proponents drawing the equivalence
between network neutrality and common carriage, see, for example, SUSAN CRAWFORD, CAPTIVE
AUDIENCE: THE TELECOM INDUSTRY AND MONOPOLY POWER IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 36, 53-56, 6162, 94, 121, 160, 162, 186-87, 230, 270 (2013); Sandvig, supra note 2, at 143-45. For statements on the
other side of the debate drawing similar conclusions, see, for example, Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality
Mandates:Neuteringthe FirstAmendment in the DigitalAge, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 197,
209 (2007); Bruce M. Owen, Antecedents to Net Neutrality, REGULATION, Fall 2007, at 14.
108.
See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 489 (3d ed. 1990); Hal Varian, Price Discriminationand Social Welfare, 75
AM. ECON. REV. 870, 870-75 (1985).
109.
Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n v. FCC, 998 F.2d 1058, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1993);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2018) (prohibiting price discrimination only among "different purchasers of
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Every agency enforcing a nondiscrimination mandate must thus face the
threshold inquiry whether or not the products being sold to two different
customers are the same product or different products, whether a price
difference exists between the two products, and if so whether that price
difference is reasonable," 0 as differences in the products being sold may justify
different prices. Likeness is determined by "functional equivalence," measured
by whether "consumers view them as performing the same functions."' Price
differences can be justified by higher levels of service, which are functionally
equivalent to a price discount." 2 When quality varies, nondiscrimination
requires regulators to determine whether services are "functionally equivalent"
from the perspective of the customer.1 13
This inquiry is relatively simple when the product is well defined and
uniform. Complexity in the product makes this exercise more complex. For
example, in Competitive Telecommunications Association, the D.C. Circuit
found that selling packaged bundles of services at lower rates was justified
because permit customers with "a business reason, such as security or service
quality, for wanting to avoid satellite or microwave communications paths"
received higher provisioning services by virtue of their ability to control the
path taken." 4 Also, products that were the product of extensive negotiations
between the network provider and a large commercial customer that reflected
that customer's particular needs were also properly regarded as different
products.' 15
The applications that dominated the early Internet-email and web
browsing were relatively modest in terms of the quality of services that they
demanded from the network. Because both were essentially file transfer
programs, their performance was determined exclusively by the timing of when
the last packet arrived." 6 In this era, broadband quality was largely determined
by bandwidth.
Modem broadband Internet access services are much more diverse.
Computer scientists now regard the quality of broadband service as varying
along at least four dimensions:

commodities of like grade and quality"); Daniel A. Lyons, Net Neutrality and NondiscriminationNorms
in Telecommunications, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1029, 1047-48 (2012) ("The Act does not prohibit all
differences in price between consumers. Rather, it only prohibits discrimination among 'like'
services.").
110.
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 917 F.2d 30,39 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
111.
Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n, 998 F.2d at 1061 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp.,
917 F.2d at 39); Ad Hoc Telecomms. Users. Comm. v. FCC, 680 F.2d 790, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

112.

Id. at 1062.

113.
114.
115.

Am. Broad. Co., v. FCC, 663 F.2d 133, 138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Competitive Telecomms. Ass'n, 998 F.2d at 1062-63.
Id. at 1063-64.

116.
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE DYNAMIC INTERNET: How TECHNOLOGY, USERS,
AND BUSINESS ARE TRANSFORMING THE NETWORK 23 (2012).
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1) Bandwidth is the carrying capacity of the network connection,
typically measured in megabits per second (Mbps).
2) Latency/delay is the amount of time an application takes to begin
operating following the initiation of the service.
3) Jitter is instability in the pattern in which packets arrive, typically
characterized by variations in the temporal spacing between consecutive
packets.
4) Reliability is determined by the percentage of packets that are
transmitted that successfully arrive at their destination."'
The applications that are emerging on the modem Internet are more
demanding in terms of these other dimensions of quality of service than email
and the World Wide Web (see Table 1). For example, streaming video and
audio are quite sensitive to jitter, but are less sensitive to reliability. Interactive
video and audio are similarly sensitive to jitter, but are also more sensitive to
latency than are streaming media services."'
Table 1: Quality of Service Demands of Traditional Internet
Applications'' 9
Application
E-mail
File transfer
Streaming audio
Streaming video
Voice over IP
Interactive video

Bandwidth
Low
Medium
Medium
High
Low
High

Reliability
High
High
Low
Low
Low
Low

Delay
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
High

Jitter
Low
Low
High
High
High
High

Waiting in the wings are a host of applications associated with the
emerging Internet of Things (loT), such as smart meters, smart grids, video
surveillance, and smart homes. These applications are demanding still different
combinations of services from the network (see Table 2). The variations in
service constitute one reason that the FCC had long declined to impose
common carriage regulation on enhanced services.' 2 0 These considerations
seem even more important today.

117.

Id. at 23-24; ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS

118.
119.
120.

YOO, supra note 116, at 24-27.
Id. at 26 tbl.2-2
Computer II Final Decision, supranote 44, at 428-30 TT 115-118.

§ 5.4.1,

at 397

(4th ed. 2003).
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Table 2: Quality of Service Demands of Emerging Internet Applications' 2
Application
Smart metering
SCADA
Video surveillance
Mobile workforce
Smart homes

Bandwidth
Low
High
High
Low
Low

Reliability
Medium
High
High
High
Medium

Delay
High
Low
Medium
Low
Low

Jitter
Low
Low
High
Low
Low

It is thus unsurprising that network providers are increasingly exploring
different forms of prioritized service. Many video and VoIP services employ
protocols such as Differentiated Services (DiffServ) and MultiProtocol Label
Switching (MPLS) to deploy voice and video services.' 22 Indeed, such services
have been part of the Internet's central design from the outset, as demonstrated
by the inclusion of the type of service field in the Internet Protocol version 4
(IPv4) specifically to accommodate prioritization of services. 2 3 These
capabilities were retained and even augmented in the transition to Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6), which retained a traffic class field to provide the
functionality associated IPv4's type of service field and added aflow label field
to accommodate the types of routing policies associated with MPLS. 24
Organizations that have traditionally been quite skeptical of previous attempts
to offer services with differential quality of service have begun to offer virtual
circuit services on a set-up and take-down basis, such as Internet2's Interactive
On-demand Network (ION).1 25 The need for more sophisticated services also
explains the widespread belief that common carriage regulation would be

121.
Kenneth C. Budka et al., Communication Network Architecture and Design
Principlesfor the Smart Grid, 15 BELLLABS TECH. J. 205 212 tbl.1 (2010).
122.
See Steven Blake et al., An Architecture for Differentiated Services (Network
Working Group
Request for Comments 2475, 1998), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/
rfc2475.txt.pdf [http://perma.cc/W9H8-T4G9]; Eric C. Rosen et al., Multiprotocol Label Switching
Architecture (Network Working Group Request for Comments 3031, 2001), http://www.rfc-editor.org
/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc3031.txt.pdf[http://perma.cc/6CQX-7TRP].
123.
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Sci.

Inst.,

Internet Protocol: DARPA

Internet Program Protocol

Specification 2, 12-13, 29-30 (Request for Comments 791, 1981), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc791 [http:/
perma.cc/DBF9-3UDN].
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Stephen E. Deering & Robert M. Hinden, Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
Specification 2, 25-26, 30-31 (Network Working Group Request for Comments 2460, 1998), http:/
tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2460 [http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2460].
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Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns ofInternet Usage, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 67, 87 (2010).
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harmful to cloud computing.' 26 The need for higher quality of service also
animates much of the planning around 5G deployments.1 27
In addition, it has long been recognized that wireless connections drop
packets much more frequently than fixed-line connections.1 28 Thus, the quality
of service provided via wireless networks are less reliable. Moreover, to the
extent that recovery from reliability relies on the traditional requirement that
the host resends the packet, lower reliability will lead to greater delay.1 29 In
addition, satellite broadband is irreducibly subject to greater latency. The
increasing practice of network providers to combine different transmission
technologies in ways that are opaque to consumers causes quality of service to
vary across different dimensions.
The limitation and standardization of service classes associated with
common carriage regulation would represent significant impediments to these
developments. History has shown that customers are demanding increasingly
diverse solutions.' 30 Indeed, the lack of common carriage provided new
entrants in traditional voice services known as Competitive Access Providers
(CAPs) with a key competitive advantage that gave them greater flexibility in
providing what consumers needed.' 3 ' Regulators evaluating nondiscrimination
claims would have to decide not only if the products are the same, but also
whether any price differentials are reasonable in light of differences in quality
or cost.
The literature also reveals that the standardization associated with
common carriage can have the unintended consequence of facilitating
collusion. 3 2 Collusion performs best when products are standardized, prices

&
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See Ergin Bayrak et al., The Economics of Cloud Computing, 27 KOREAN ECON.
REV. 203, 211-12 (2011); Erik Brynjolfsson et al., Cloud Computing and Electricity: Beyond the Utility
Model, COMM. ACM, May 2010, at 32, 34; Kenji E. Kushida et al., Diffusing the Cloud: Cloud
Computing andImplicationsfor Public Policy, 11 J. INDUS. COMPETITION & TRADE 209, 212 (2011).
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See Alaa Al-Shaikhli & Amir Esmailpour, Quality of Service Management in 5G
Broadband Converged Networks, PROC. 36TH IEEE SARNOFF SYMP. 56 (2015); Valery Tikhvinskiy
Grigory Bochechka, Quality of Service in 5G Networks, in OPPORTUNITIES IN 5G NETWORKS: A
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 97, 97 (Fei Hu ed., 2016).
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130.
See, e.g., YOO, supranote 116, at 27-35; Peter K. Pitsch & Arthur W. Bresnahan,
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FED. COMM. L.J. 447, 473-75 (1996) (citing Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890,
Preliminary Statement, 27 F.C.C. 359, 369-71 TT 24-27 (1959)); Schoenwald, supranote 9, at 401, 41415 (citing Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities
Authorizations Therefor, Sixth Report and Order, 99 F.C.C.2d 1020, 1032 ¶ 18 (1985)).
131.
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132.
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2015); SCHERER& ROSS, supra note 108, at 279-80, 348; Andrew F. Daughety & Robert Forsythe, The
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are visible, and secret discounting is impossible, while cartels are most
effectively destabilized by unsystematic price discrimination. Requiring
providers to adhere to defined products and a posted, uniform rate schedule
provides the type of standardization and information sharing that has long been
recognized as a facilitating practice for collusion.1 33 Preventing providers from
charging less than as well as more than posted prices can harm consumers by
displacing any discounts they may be able to negotiate 34 and can even turn the
agency into a cartel enforcer.1 35 In addition, posting requirements allows
providers to sit back and receive advance notice of competitors' price cuts and
any innovations in their business models.1 36 That is why "an antidiscrimination
law rigidly imposed on a cartelized market provides the means for effective
cartel control."1 37

Lastly, nondiscrimination can tum uniform pricing into both a price floor
as well as a price ceiling that can harm consumers. Exemplified by the fixed
rate doctrine, in which the tariffed price constitutes the entire contract that
brooks no deviations in either direction, this vision of nondiscrimination that
prevents individualized discounts as well as high prices hurts consumers. As a
result, it can tum nondiscrimination into a sword that hurts consumers as well
as a shield that protects consumers.1 38
2. Rate Regulation
Rate regulation also faces serious challenges when the product being
regulated is complex instead of simply being a commodity.1 39 When the
product is a commodity, regulators need only oversee a single dimension
price-in order to limit the regulated firm's ability to extract surplus. The
situation is quite different when the regulated product varies in quality and
where the provider has the incentive to avoid rate regulation by skimping on

&

133.
Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Market, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 5 FCC Rcd. 2627, 2644 ¶ 143 (1990) [hereinafter IXC Competition NPRM]. For Supreme
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Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 410 (1921). For a general discussion on how information
sharing facilities collusion, see SCHERER& ROSS, supra note 108, at 348.
134.
See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Towarda Unified Theory ofAccess
to Local Telephone Networks, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 43, 84-85 (2008).
135.
Yoo, supra note 8, at 604.
136.
Pitsch & Bresnahan, supranote 130, at 482-83 (citing IXC Competition NPRM,
supra note 133, at 2644 ¶ 143); Schoenwald, supra note 9, at 415-16 (citing Policy and Rules
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445, 453 ¶26 (1981)).
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139.
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quality.' 40 The initial models suggest that regulating maximum prices reduces
the quality for customers with low willingness to pay, but increases the quality
for customers with high willingness to pay, which makes the welfare
implications ambiguous.141 Later extensions showed that when providers offer
a higher tier of unregulated services in addition to the lower tier of rate
regulated services, rate regulation on the lower tier can cause the provider to
remove products from the bundle of products subject to price regulation and the
increase in prices on the unregulated tier.1 42
The commentary on common carriage has recognized that rate regulation
is more problematic when the regulated product exhibits significant variations
in quality.1 43 The difficulties associated with imposing rate regulation on noncommodity products are also illustrated by the empirical literature studying the
U.S. experience with regulating the rates charged for basic cable television
service. These studies have found that while rate regulation caused nominal
cable prices to fall, it also induced differences in quality, reflected in the total
number and quality of channels offered. Once rates are adjusted for quality, the
empirical evidence indicates that rate regulation actually caused qualityadjusted rates to rise. Conversely, rate deregulation caused quality-adjusted
rates to fall.1 44

Simply put, the welfare implications of rate regulation for non-commodity
products are complex and ambiguous. The potential to vary quality allows the
regulated provider to avoid rate regulation by degrading its product. In theory,
these degradations could be avoided if the regulator engages in comprehensive
regulation of minimum quality. Such quality standards are difficult to
implement and struggle to account for endogenous changes in the quality of
higher-tier services.
This is why common carriage regulation works best when the product is a
commodity and where the quality of the product does not vary. This has
historically been true for water, natural gas, and electric power.1 45 It is also true
for traditional telephone calling, which simply requires latencies of less than
300 milliseconds under the quality guidelines established by the International
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al., The MultiproductFirm, Quality Choice, and Regulation, 36 J. INDUS. ECON. 411, 419 (1988).
142.
Kenneth S. Corts, Regulation of a Multi-ProductMonopolist: Effects on Pricing
and Bundling, 43 J. INDUS. ECON. 377 (1995).
143.
See, e.g., Noam, supra note 7, at 219 ("Historically, rate regulation is easiest to
administer where the product can be clearly defined and quantified .... Rate regulation is much more
difficult when it deals with complex and variable mixtures of services . . . .").
144.

See THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD

CABLE TELEVISION 69-177, 208 (1997); Gregory S. Crawford, The Impact of the 1992 Cable Act on
HouseholdDemand and Welfare, 31 RAND J. ECON. 422, 444-45 (2000).
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Noam, supra note 7, at 219.

1013

Yale Journal on Regulation

Vol. 35, 2018

Telecommunications Union.1 46 It is less true for modem Internet services, in

which quality varies in multiple dimensions.
B. The Simplicity of the Interfaces Surrounding the Regulated Product
The performance of common carriage regulation also depends on the
nature of the interface between the product being regulated and related
products. Both nondiscrimination and rate regulation function best when such
interfaces are simple and struggle when such interfaces are complex.
1. Nondiscrimination
The tractability of disputes over what constitutes nondiscriminatory
access depends in no small part on the relative complexity of the interface
between the company seeking access and the company providing access.1 47 The
parties are likely to disagree not only about access prices, but also about
nondiscrimination with respect to a wide range of non-price terms and
conditions as well.1 48 The more complex the interface, the more problematic
and protracted these disputes will be.
The impact of the complexity of the interface on the implementation of a
nondiscrimination mandate is demonstrated eloquently by the FCC's
experience attempting to require AT&T to provide nondiscriminatory access to
unaffiliated long distance providers. The complexity and information-richness
of the interface of the boundary between long distance service and the local
service needed to connect to that service "permitted a thousand ways in which
a reluctant Bell System local access provider could hamper and restrict
potential long distance competitors."1 49 The result is that long distance access
was plagued by complaints that about non-price terms, such as delays by the
incumbent in provisioning lines for new subscribers signed up by competitors
and the number of digits required to access long distance services. 50
Similar problems plagued the implementation of the provision of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required incumbent local exchange
carriers to provide nondiscriminatory access to all elements of their networks at
any technically feasible point. '5 Mandating access to unbundled network
146.
Int'l Telecomm. Union [ITU], ITU Recommendation G. 114 (2003), http:/
www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-G.1 14-200305-I/en [http://perma.cc/5C2R-TWF2].
147.
See Yoo, supranote 97, at 244-45.
148.
3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 98, ¶ 773, at 216-17, ¶ 774e, at 227-28,
¶787, at 281-82 (1996); POSNER, supra note 98, at 211; Keith N. Hylton,Economic Rents andEssential
Facilities, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1243, 1283-84; Bruce M. Owen, Determining Optimal Access to
Regulated Essential Facilities, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 887, 890, 893 (1990); Gregory J. Werden, The Law
and Economics ofthe Essential FacilityDoctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433, 460-61 (1987).
149.
Gerald R. Faulhaber, Policy-Induced Competition: The Telecommunications
Experiments, 15 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 73, 81 (2003).
Id. at 80.
150.
151.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2018).
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elements (UNEs) deep inside a network that the provider was not offering as a
separate service ensured that interface would be quite complex. Justice
Breyer's dissent in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Boardnoted that the administrative
and social costs of overseeing such a mandate are likely to be considerable.' 5 2
These concerns were later embraced by the full Supreme Court in Trinko,
which also arose from complaints that the incumbent was provisioning
competitors' lines too slowly.' 53 The Court noted that "the means of illicit
exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are myriad."' 54
Distinguishing between the two is particularly difficult to evaluate when
disputes are "highly technical" and "extremely numerous, given the incessant,
complex, and constantly changing interaction" between the parties seeking
connection and the network. 5 5 The resulting complexity can lead to "death by
a thousand cuts" that regulators will be hard pressed to oversee.1 56
Changes in the Internet's architecture mean that the interconnection of
different networks is becoming increasingly complex. Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) that used to connect only through a single network are now
connecting through multiple networks through practices such as multi-homing,
secondary peering, and other creative arrangements. In addition, the growing
use of third-party and proprietary data centers, content distribution networks
(CDNs), and other solutions that use storage in innovative ways to reduce the
burden on the network are requiring new interfaces, complete with ways to
provision and meter the services provided. 57
Furthermore, the Law of Requisite Variety teaches that the growing
demand for increasingly diverse services will create the need for increasingly
complex interfaces to provide the needed functionality, because the number of
levers in the interface must necessarily match the number of potential
disturbances if the system is to maintain homeostasis. 5 These pressures in turn
create pressure for the interfaces and the distribution of functions to change.
In addition, the growing variety of network topologies makes the problems
even more complex.' 60 The net result is to make the nondiscrimination mandate
associated with common carriage even more difficult to implement. To the
extent that variations in the interfaces exist, enforcement of nondiscrimination

152.
153.

525 U.S. 366, 429 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 403-
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requires determining how much of a disparity in price those differences would
justify.
2. Rate Regulation
The complexity of the interface is also likely to have an adverse impact on
rate regulation. Common carriage applies in a meaningful way only when one
of the parties does not want to enter into a business relationship with the other
party. The relationship is thus likely to be plagued by disputes over the
reasonableness of prices.' 6 ' As noted earlier, such disputes are likely to extend
to a wide variety of non-price conditions as well.' 62
In this regard, the FCC's experience in enforcing leased access to cable
television systems is instructive. The service has gone largely unused, with the
parties disagreeing over whether prices are excessive and whether restrictions
on non-price terms and conditions are too restrictive. 6 3 It also provides a
largely unappreciated explanation of why unbundled access to local telephone
networks proved unsuccessful: The statute analyzed access entirely in terms of
the economics of replicability without taking into account the complexity of the
interfaces and the interdependencies that for technical reasons made certain
clusters of tasks into transaction-free zones.1 64
Similar concerns are likely to arise with respect to network neutrality. The
complexity of the interface is likely to require fairly comprehensive oversight
of the entirety of the business relationship between the companies seeking
access

and the

companies providing

it.1 65 The growing

intensity

and

heterogeneity of the demands on the network and the inevitable increase in the
complexity of the interface makes this aspect of common carriage increasingly
challenging to oversee.
C. Stability and Uniformity in the Transmission Technology
Commentators have long recognized that common carriage functions best
when the transmission technology is relatively static and uniform. Conversely,
common carriage faces considerable difficulties when different providers use
different technologies and when those technologies are in a state of flux.
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1. Nondiscrimination
Consider first how non-uniformity and dynamism in transmission
technologies make nondiscrimination hard to implement. Recall that the
textbook definition of price discrimination is a variation in price that is not
justified by differences in cost or product quality.' 66 This requires not only a
comparison of the relevant products. It also requires a comparison of the
underlying production technologies used to create the products or services.
Such comparisons are relatively simple when production technologies are
uniform and stable and when the costs of providing service do not vary
customer to customer or from provider to provider. They become considerably
more difficulty when production technologies differ or when the costs of
serving different customers varies.
In the case of water, natural gas, and electric power, the transmission
technologies have long been relatively stable and uniform.' 67 The same is not
true with the Internet. Different providers employ a wide array of technologies,
such as cable modems, digital subscriber lines (DSL), fiber-to-the-home, and
wireless broadband.' 6 8 Increasingly, providers are also combining different
technologies together. For example, wireless broadband providers are
increasingly shedding load from their cellular broadband networks by
configuring their networks to seamlessly migrate traffic to WiFi supported by
fixed-line connections.' 69 In addition, AT&T's acquisition of DirecTV has
permitted it to provide over-the-top distribution for video content that used to
be carried exclusively on DirecTV's satellite network.'
Moreover, the cost of providing service can vary from customer to
customer even when they are employing the same transmission technology. As
an initial matter, rate averaging means that urban and rural consumers pay the
same prices despite the fact that the real costs of providing rural service are
much higher than the costs of providing urban service. Charging consumers the
same price when their real costs differ represents another, less obvious, form of
discrimination. '7' This is why the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that
charging urban and rural customers the same price in the name of promoting
universal service represents "state-sanctioned discrimination."1 72
166.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
167.
See Noam, supranote 7, at 219.
168.
YOO, supra note 116, at 37-50.
169.
Adnan Aijaz et al., A Survey on Mobile Data Offloading: Technical and Business
Perspectives, IEEE WIRELESS COMM., Apr. 2013, at 104; Richad Maallawi et al., A Comprehensive
Survey of Offload Techniques and Management in Wireless Access and Core Networks, 17 IEEE COMM.

SURV. & TUTORIALS 1582 (2015); Filippo Rebecchi et al., Data Offloading Techniques in Cellular
Networks: A Survey, 17 IEEE COMM. SURV. & TUTORIALS 580 (2014).
170.
Marguerite Reardon & Dara Kerr, AT&T CEO Makes the Case for Acquiring
Time Warner, CNET (Oct. 4, 2017, 3:32 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/at-t-ceo-makes-the-case-fortime-warner-megamerger [http://perma.cc/MT4X-XSLH].
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Another source of cost variation is congestion. 7 3 The design of many
broadband networks requires end users to share bandwidth locally.1 74 This
allows a small number of super-heavy users to impose significant congestion
costs on the other users sharing the same node.1 75 Charging customers the same
price despite the fact that the congestion costs caused by their activities differs
is a form of discrimination.1 76 Techniques to remediate such behavior, such as
data caps, are often greeted with claims that they are a form of discrimination
designed to harm streaming video services in an attempt to protect legacy cable
revenues.' 7 7 Given that Netflix and YouTube by themselves occupy more than
50% of the available primetime downstream bandwidth makes it inevitable that
any attempt to curb congestion will have a limiting effect on online video. 78
Moreover, such efforts are cost-justified measures that comply with the
principles of nondiscrimination.1 79 Indeed, the differences in cost suggest that
the failure to impose usage-sensitive pricing would be more properly regarded
as discriminatory than would the imposition of such measures.
Differences in transmission technology thus imply that charging
customers different prices for what appears to be the same service may be
reasonable. Regulators charged with enforcing nondiscrimination must be able
to discern the nature of the differences and assess what price differentials might
be justified.
2. Rate Regulation
Dynamic change in the transmission technologies greatly complicates the
process of rate regulation as well.' One of the longest standing disputes under
common carriage is over whether rates should be based on historical cost or
replacement cost."' Commentators have long recognized that replacement cost
better reflects the state of the art technology and provides more appropriate
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179.
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180.
For an example in another industry where changes in production technology
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signals of when companies should self-provision their facilities instead of
seeking access to the existing network. The problem has long been that
replacement cost is hard to implement, requiring extended battles between
experts disputing over the costs of a hypothetical network comprised of the best
available technology. Historical cost has the advantage of being easier to
implement and has been more widely employed.' 82 When technology is
relatively static, the wedge between replacement cost and historical cost
remains relatively narrow. The more technology changes, the bigger the wedge
between historical cost and replacement cost becomes.1 83
All of this was on full display when the FCC was developing rules to
implement the 1996 amendments to the Pole Attachments Act. The FCC
recognized that it had used replacement cost methodologies when it was
important to provide accurate cost signals about whether new entrants should
build their own networks or rely on those of incumbents.' 84 However, such
considerations were less important when the transmission technology is
relatively static. Indeed, when that is the case, historical and replacement cost
methodologies are likely to yield similar results.'
The FCC's reasoning thus recognizes that the tools of common carriage
are considerably easier to apply when the transmission technology is stable.
That is not the case with the modem Internet, in which multiple transmission
technologies are vying for customers and in which there have been dramatic
shifts in the technologies used to access the Internet over time. 8 6 This will
intensify further as fiber-to-the-home, 4G LTE, and 5G continue to deploy.
D. Whether the TransmissionNetwork Is Fully Built Out
Another critical determinant of the efficacy of common carriage
regulation is the extent to which the transmission network is already built out
and fully amortized. Common carriage is less well suited when the network
requires significant capital expenditures to extend or upgrade it.
1. Nondiscrimination
Requirements of nondiscriminatory access can have a dramatic impact on
the incentives to invest in new infrastructure. The theoretical arguments of how
network sharing requirements can create a tragedy of the commons that

182.
For the classic statement, see Mo. ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292-302, 308-10 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
183.
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Attachments, Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 FCC Rcd. 12103, 12117-18 ¶23
(2001) [hereinafter Consol. Reconsideration Order].
185.
Id. at 12118 ¶24.
186.
YOO, supra note 116, at 37-50.
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dampens investment incentives are well rehearsed' and supported by a
burgeoning empirical literature. 8 8 Although the empirical literature on the
subject is the most extensive with respect to unbundling,' 89 the basic intuitions
apply to all forms of infrastructure sharing.
The Supreme Court has similarly recognized that compelling network
owners to share their networks "may lessen the incentive for the monopolist,
the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities."' 90 What
is less well recognized is the extent to which access mandates create adverse
selection problems. Competitors can avoid making any investments and instead
simply obtain access to resources that have proven to be economically viable.
Access regimes thus allow competitors to make decisions ex post after the ex
ante risks have been validated one way or the other.' 9' Access regimes can also
increase sorting costs by allowing competitors to wait and see which
geographies prove viable. The reality that access regimes require those making
initial investments to share access to those areas that prove successful while
bearing all of the losses on those regions that prove unsuccessful further
dampens investment.' 92
More fundamentally, all industries with high fixed costs and low marginal
costs face a long-recognized pricing problem that can adversely affect
investment incentives. 9 3 If a product facing low or zero marginal costs is to
break even, every unit must be priced to recover some share of the fixed cost as
well as the marginal cost. The problem is that by forcing prices above marginal
cost, any allocation of fixed cost necessarily creates some deadweight loss. On
the other hand, pushing prices closer to marginal cost reduces incentives to
invest.1 94 As Frank Ramsey recognized nearly a century ago, such problems
can be eliminated if a higher proportion of the fixed costs are allocated to price
insensitive customers, whose consumption will not drop significantly even if
187.
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charged higher prices, and a lower proportion of the fixed costs are allocated to
price sensitive customers. 195
This is why economists generally recognize that demand-side price
discrimination is a necessary condition to efficient market provision of
intellectual property.1 96 Commentators have drawn similar conclusions with
respect to network industries.1 97 A broad nondiscrimination mandate would
prevent this solution from being realized. Such considerations are less relevant
if the relevant networks are fully built out and entry by subsequent competitors
is infeasible. They play a key role, however, when investment in new network
capacity represents a key policy goal.
2. Rate Regulation
Rate regulation can also have a negative impact on investment incentives
and thus pose significant problems if the network is not yet built out. Simply
put, short-run supra-competitive prices play a critical positive role in signaling
to industry actors that the relevant markets are in disequilibrium and attract the
investment that shifts out the supply curve to bring the market back into
equilibrium.

195.
The seminal analysis in the context of taxation is Frank J. Ramsey, A
Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). Ramsey's insights were extended to
regulated industry by William J. Baumol & David Bradford, Optimal Departuresform Marginal Cost
Pricing, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 265 (1970).
196.
See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Daniel G. Swanson, The New Economy and
Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power, 70

ANTITRUST L.J. 661, 671-73 (2003) (showing how price discrimination is essential in high fixed cost
industries and occurs even when those industries are competitive).
197.
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&
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS, at xv (2000) ("Marginal-cost pricing for all services is not viable in telecom
industries.").
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Figure 1: Short-Run Disequilibrium from an Exogenous Shock
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The reasons for this tradeoff are familiar to anyone who has taken
Economics 101. The basic equilibrium dynamics are depicted in Figures 1 and
2, with the industry-level dynamics depicted in the left-hand graph and the
firm-level dynamics depicted in the right-hand graph. Assume that a market
finds itself in disequilibrium, perhaps because a change in demand causes the
demand curve to shift outwards.
The result in the short run is that prices will rise, as the market attempts to
allocate supply that has become all-too scarce. Maintaining the previous price
would simply induce shortages, as the new demand at that price would far
outstrip the available supply. The higher price also allows the competing firms
to earn above-cost returns. If entry is infeasible, the new equilibrium will be
stable. If entry is feasible, however, the resulting profits attract investments in
new production capacity that shifts the supply curve outward until the profits
are dissipated and the market once again returns to long-run equilibrium.

1022

Common Carriage's Domain
Figure 2: Return to Long-Run Equilibrium Through Outward Shift in the
Supply Curve
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Consider the critical role played by supra-competitive prices and supracompetitive returns. These prices and returns signal other actors that the market
is in disequilibrium, and the desire to share in the supra-competitive profits
provides the incentive for producers to make the additional investments in
production capacity that causes the supply curve to shift outward. Moreover, if
entry is feasible, such supra-competitive prices and profits should not persist.
Conversely, if prices are not permitted to rise, such investments will not occur,
and the shortages will become persistent. On the other hand, if entry is
infeasible, investments in additional capacity will never occur, and protecting
investment incentives serves little use.
This is why Justice Breyer recognized in AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board
that "a sharing requirement may diminish the original owner's incentive to
keep up or to improve the property by depriving the owner of the fruits of
value-creating investment, research, or labor."1 98 He further observed that one
cannot "guarantee that firms will undertake the investment necessary to
produce complex technological innovations knowing that any competitive
advantage deriving from those innovations will be dissipated by the sharing
requirement."199 He similarly noted in Verizon v. FCC that compelling

198.

525 U.S. 366, 428-29 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

199.

Id. at 429.

part).
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incumbents to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation
destroys the incumbent's incentives to innovate in the first place.200
The entire Supreme Court later embraced Justice Breyer's concerns about
access requirements' impact on the incumbents' incentives to reinvest in their
network in its 2004 Trinko decision, which recognized, "The mere possession
of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not
only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system. The
opportunity to charge monopoly prices at least for a short period is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth," including through investments in
infrastructure. Because of that, "[c]ompelling such firms to share the source of
their advantage .

. may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or

.

both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities." 20 1
The dampening of investment incentives matters less when the network is
already built out. When that is the case, employing rate regulation that dampens
investment signals is less important. Moreover, if further entry is impossible,
then short-run high prices will not stimulate new entry sufficient to shift out the
supply curve and dissipate the supra-competitive returns.
Again, the implementation of the 1996 amendments to the Pole
Attachments Act illustrates the issue. As noted earlier, the issue was whether to
employ the more market-oriented methodology based on replacement cost or
the more easily implemented methodology based on historical cost. The FCC
recognized that even though replacement cost would have provided more
accurate signals about whether new entrants should invest in their own
networks instead of relying on the incumbents', such considerations were less
important in the context of pole attachments because local regulation and
prohibitive cost make construction of a second network of poles infeasible.
When "attachers .

.

. do not face a realistic 'make or buy' decision, the benefits

of giving proper cost signals to new entrants are less pronounced." 202
The propriety of rate regulation thus turns in part on whether the network
has already been constructed or requires additional investment. When the
central problem is stimulating additional capital expenditures, short-run supracompetitive prices play a critical role in stimulating the necessary investment.
On the other hand, if rate regulation succeeds in ratcheting down prices to
competitive levels when entry is possible, it risks substantially dampening both
competitors' and the incumbent's incentive to invest in expanding or improving
its network infrastructure.

200.
part and dissenting in
201.
(2004).
202.
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E. Stability in the Demandfor Each Firm's Production
Lastly, common carriage functions best when the demand for each firm's
production remains relatively stable. Unit prices are traditionally set by
determining a firm's overall revenue requirement and then dividing that
requirement by the expected quantity demanded for that firm's services. Firms
can enjoy substantial windfalls or suffer from drastic shortages should the sales
volume deviate from expected levels. 03
The problem is demonstrated aptly by the recent disputes over traffic
pumping, in which small carriers negotiated rates for terminating calls based on
their historical call volumes, which were quite low, and then radically
increasing their terminating call volume by advertising free services that only
terminate calls, such as conference calling or free adult chat-line services.
These customers then advertise their conference calling or chat-line services on
the Internet as free services. In one case, traffic pumping caused terminating
traffic to surge from 15,000 minutes to 6.4 million minutes in a five-month
span, which resulted in a $10-$15 million increase in revenue above expected
levels. 20 4

This example underscores the difficulty in setting rates when sales
volumes are faced with considerable uncertainty. This includes both variability
around market share as well as uncertainty regarding the size of the overall
market. The dynamic nature of the Internet industry thus provides some reason
to believe that policymakers will find it challenging to apply common carriage
principles to the Internet.
Conclusion
The judicial decision holding that including a nondiscrimination rule
would be proper only if broadband Internet access were classified as a common
carrier sparked strong interest among policymakers and network neutrality
advocates in embracing common carriage as the basis for the Open Internet
Order. Unfortunately, they have often done so without taking into account
common carriage's limitations revealed in the academic commentary and its
implementation history.
This Essay seeks to fill this void by suggesting a five-part framework for
analyzing when common carriage is most likely to succeed. The factors suggest
that the modem Internet constitutes a poor candidate for successful common
carriage regulation. Assigning relative weights to each factor and determining

203.
Noam, supra note 7, at 219 (noting that "rate regulation is easiest to administer
... where the industry is relatively stable" and is "more difficult ... where the regulated industry is
extremely dynamic in its development").
204.
See Virgil Larson, Big Phone Carriers Say Small Firms Bleed Them, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, May 16, 2007, at ID.
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how likely common carriage is to be successful if some, but not all, of the
criteria are met is left to future research.
The fact that history suggests that common carriage remedies are unlikely
to be difficult to administer when imposed on the Internet raises what at first
might appear to be a conundrum. The Supreme Court's decision in Trinko
suggests that antitrust law is also poorly suited to oversee such access
remedies. 20 5 This raises the possibility that neither antitrust law nor regulation
could address any potential problems.
On reflection, such a possibility should not be surprising. Trinko reminds
us that intervention under the antitrust laws is not costless and that liability
should be imposed only when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs.206 This
means that the costs of antitrust enforcement may counsel in favor abstaining
from intervention even when the unregulated market would not perform in a
perfectly competitive manner. Instead, the imperfections of the remedies
necessarily require policymakers to engage in a comparative second-best
analysis and tolerate imperfect market performance when the would-be cure
would be worse than the disease.
The same is true for regulation. The fact that telecommunications
regulation is costly similarly requires a comparison of second-best outcomes. It
may well be that the unregulated market would perform so badly that
intervention would be better for consumers notwithstanding the costs
associated with imposing that regulation. Oligopolistic markets similarly fall
short of the competitive ideal, but as the number of competitors increases, the
economic performance of the unregulated market improves. Eventually, the
improvement in performance reaches the point where the balance between
unregulated oligopoly and regulated oligopoly tips the other way and
policymakers find that the benefits of regulation no longer exceed the costs.207
It is important to bear in mind that at this point, the market still does not
perform perfectly. The comparative second-best analysis teaches us that
sometimes there will be imperfections that the law is unable to remediate.
The recognition that the law cannot necessarily right every wrong is part
of the growing humility over the past few decades about what the law can do.
Tempting as it might be to try to use the law to fix every problem that
regulators can identify, a clear recognition the types of remedies that courts and
regulators can manage effectively provides new insights into the proper limits
of common carriage's domain.
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